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Institutional balance and sincere cooperation in Treaty Making 
Under EU Law 
 
Panos Koutrakos*  
 
ABSTRACT  
 
A stream of recent judgments by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice 
has shed light on the procedures that govern treaty-making by the European Union. 
This article explores how this case-law aproaches the principle of institutional balance 
and the duty of cooperation between the institutions. It argues that the former is 
construed in a balanced manner on the basis of a literal interpretation of primary law 
that promotes strict compliance with procedural rules and does not favour a particular 
institution. As for the duty of cooperation, whilste its procedural dimension is 
strengthened, its scope remains somewhat elusive. The analysis identifies a pragmatic 
streak in the Court’s balanced approach, and argues that there is an inherent limit to the 
impact of constitutional law on inter-institutional disputes. Ultimately, the less time and 
energy the institutions waste on turf wars about their procedural powers, the greater 
their contribution to inceasing the efficiency of the Union’s treaty-making practice. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Treaty-making by the European Union (EU) is being talked about. Once occupying the 
minds of only decision-makers, mandarins, and lawyers, it is now the subject of public 
discourse. The on-again, off-again negotiation of the now moribund Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP),1 the signing and provisional application of 
the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA),2 and the conclusion of 
the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in the Netherlands3 have all brought public 
attention not only to what the EU does as a treaty-making actor, but also to how it does 
it. This interest increased further after the 23 June 2016 referendum in the United 
Kingdom and the ensuing negotiations with the EU about Brexit.4  
 
                                                      *Professor of EU Law and Jean Monnet Professor of EU Law, City, University of London, 
panos.koutrakos.1@city.ac.uk. Many thanks to Sir Alan Dashwood QC and the anonymous referees. All 
errors and omissions are my own.  
1 At the time of writing, instead of any progress on the TTIP front, there is a concern about the aggresively 
unilateralist initiatives of the Trump administration. On 25 June 2018, the two parties agreed to negotiate 
about how to negotiate a closer trade relation (Joint EU-U.S. Statement following President Juncker’s 
visit to the White House: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1898). 
2 See [2017] OJ L 11/23. 
3 Following the non-binding referendum in the Netherlands, see Decision of the Heads of State or 
Government of the 28 Member States of the European Union, meeting within the European Council, 
Annexed to European Council Conclusions on Ukraine (15 December 2016). 
4 Art. 50 TEU that governs the Brexit negotiations states that these would be governed by Article 218(3) 
TFEU, that is the provision pursuant to which the EU negotiates agreements with third countries. This is 
analysed in Section 3 of the article. The EU rules on treaty-making will also govern the negotiation and 
conclusion of any agreement on the future relationship between the EU and the UK.   
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The rules and procedures governing the process of the negotiation and conclusion of 
international treaties are laid down in Article 218 TFEU. Described by Dashwood as 
‘the procedural code’ for treaty-making,5 they apply to most international agreements.6 
These provisions are of a constitutional character. As the Court of Justice puts it,7  
  
Article 218 TFEU constitutes, as regards the conclusion of international  treaties, an  
autonomous and general provision of constitutional scope, in that it confers specific powers on 
the EU institutions. With a view to establishing a balance between those institutions, it 
provides, in particular, that agreements  between the European Union and one or more third 
States are to be negotiated by the Commission, in compliance with the negotiating directives 
drawn up by the Council, and then concluded by the Council, either after obtaining the consent 
of the European Parliament or after consulting it….   
 
The constitutional character of the procedures governing treaty-making and the 
definition of the scope of the ensuing powers of the institutions have profound 
implications for the EU’s policy and practice. After all, in principle, the violation of the 
internal, that is the EU, procedural rules on treaty-making notwithstanding, a treaty 
concluded by the EU would be binding on the EU under international law.8  
 
These provisions have been the subject-matter of a stream of recent cases. This is 
explained by the increasing prominence that the EU has attached to its global action in 
the last decade. The amendments of Article 218 TFEU may also have a role to play: 
they streamline the applicable procedures and recalibrate the underlying relationship 
between the different institutions, 9  with the position of the European Parliament 
significantly enhanced.10 This revamped constitutional framework has provided fertile 
ground for legal disputes about how the EU should exercise its treaty-making powers.  
 
This recent case-law on treaty-making will provide the canvas for this article. There are 
good reasons for this choice: the judgments were all rendered by the Grand Chamber 
and a considerable number of Member States intervened in many of these cases. There 
is also a broader point: in a short period of time, this case-law has settled a considerable 
number of fundamental questions about the procedures that govern the Union’s treaty-
making. By elaborating on the institutional and procedural dimension, it has brought to 
the fore an aspect of EU external relations law that had not attracted as much attention 
                                                 
5 A Dashwood, M Dougan, B Rodger, E Spaventa, D Wyatt, Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union 
Law 6th ed (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) 936.  
6 Special rules apply to the conclusion of exchange rate and monetary agreements which is governed by 
Article 219 TFEU, and to the agreements concluded in the area of Common Commercial Policy in so far 
as ‘special provisions’ are provided for in Article 207 TFEU.  
7  Case C-425/13 Commission v Parliament (EU-Australia trading emissions agreement) 
EU:C:2015:483, para. 62. This formulation originated in Case C-327/91 France v Commission 
EU:C:1994:305, para. 28, except that the term ‘constitutional’ had only been included in the summary 
of the judgment in the official Court reports.  
8 See Case C-327/91 France v Commission EU:C:1994:305, para 25. See also Art. 46(2) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties which codifies customary international law (Certain Questions of 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v France) (2008) ICJ Rep 177. 
9  For the Lisbon Treaty amendments on EU external relations provisions, see, amongst others, P 
Koutrakos (ed.), The European Union’s external relations a year after Lisbon (2011) CLEER Working 
Paper 3.  
10 PJ Kuijper suggests that, at Lisbon, ‘foreign policy underwent a wave of democratization’: ‘The Case 
Law of the Court of Justice and the Allocation of External Relations Powers: Whither the Traditional 
Role of the Executive in EU Foreign Relations?’ in M Cremona and A Thies (eds), The European Court 
of Justice and External Relations Law-Constitutional Challenges (Hart Publishing 2014) 95 at 113.  
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as the disputes about treaty-making competence. After all, it was the existence and, 
crucially, the nature of external competence that had dominated this area of law since 
its genesis in the early 1970s. This emphasis manifested itself in a series of judgments, 
starting with the historic AETR case,11 the complexity of which has exercised policy-
makers in Brussels and national capitals over the years.12 These principles have been 
so nuanced and context-specific that their incorporation in primary law at Lisbon has 
hardly enhanced the much-needed clarity necessary for their application.13 In fact, it is 
more than 45 years since the AETR doctrine has been introduced and questions about 
the nature and scope of the Union’s external competence are still being raised.14 
 
The case-law examined in this article moves in another direction: it sheds light on 
another layer of what the EU does in the world, that is the procedural, and is about how 
the EU and/or Member States may act in the process of treaty-making. The emphasis 
on this dimension is a sign of maturity for EU external relations, as it illustrates a greater 
emphasis on the mechanics of what the EU does in the world. Focusing on the 
practicalities of policy-making, the case-law examined in this article contributes to 
making EU external relations a more rounded area of law.   
 
In the politically charged context that prevails currently, commentators have addressed 
the legal implications of treaty-making for the effectiveness of the Union’s external 
action.15 This article will approach this area from another perspective: it will explore 
how the institutions relate to each other. Rather than analysing all aspects of the 
procedures governing treaty-making,16 this article will focus on two themes, namely 
the principle of institutional balance and the duty of cooperation. 
 
2. The themes: institutional balance and the duty of cooperation 
 
The first theme, that is the principle of institutional balance, is embedded in the EU’s 
DNA. As early as in 1958, the European Court of Justice, in Meroni, referred to ‘the 
balance of powers which is characteristic of the institutional structure of the 
Community’.17 As is well known, this principle is not about a balanced allocation of 
powers.18 It is, instead, about the division of powers between institutions by the framers 
                                                 
11 Case 22/70 Commission v Council EU:C:1971:32. 
12 See B De Witte, ‘Too much constitutional law in the European Union's Foreign Relations?’ in M 
Cremona and B De Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law (Hart Publishing, 2008).  
13 See G De Baere and P Koutrakos, ‘The Interactions Between the Legislature and the Judiciary in EU 
External Relations’ in P Syrpis (ed.), The Relationship Between the Legislature and the Judiciary in the 
Internal Market (CUP 2012) 243. 
14 See, for instance, Opinion 2/15 EU:C:2017:376 and Opinion 3/15 EU:C:2017:114.  
15 See, for instance, G Van der Loo and R A. Wessel, 'The non-ratification of mixed agreements: Legal 
consequences and solutions' (2017) 54 CMLRev 735. For a broader and older  perspective of mixity, see 
also C Hillion and P Koutrakos (eds), Mixed Agreements Revisited – The EU and its Member States in 
the World (Hart Publishing, 2010). 16  See A Dashwood, ‘EU Acts and Member State Acts in the Negotiation, Conclusion and 
Implementation of International Agreements’ in M Cremona and C Kilpatrick (eds) EU Legal Acts – 
Challenges and Transformations (Oxford: OUP, 2018) 189.  
17 Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority EU:C:1958:7, p152. 
18 See J. - P. Jacqué, ‘The Principle of Institutional Balance’, (2004) 41 CMLRev 384. 
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of the Treaties in a manner that would reflect the legal and political nature of the 
Union.19 As the Court puts it,20  
 
[t]he Treaties set up a system for distributing powers among the different Community 
institutions, assigning to each institution its own role in the institutional structure of the 
Community and the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community’. 
 
Viewed from this angle, the principle of institutional balance is intrinsically linked to 
the principle of conferral.21 As the latter governs what the EU does, the former governs 
what the EU institutions do in order to enable the EU to act in accordance with the 
powers conferred under primary law. The principle of institutional balance 
encapsulates, therefore, the institutional implications of the principle of conferral.  
 
There is also a second dimension in institutional balance: in addition to what the 
institutions do, the principle governs how they do it. The principle of institutional 
balance is, therefore, about ensuring that the coexistence of the EU institutions would 
be based on a system of inherent constraints on their interactions: ‘each of the 
institutions must exercise its powers with due regard for the powers of the other 
institutions’.22 Put differently, ‘in accordance with the balance of powers between the 
institutions provided for by the treaties, the practice of [an institution, in that case the 
European Parliament] cannot deprive the other institutions of a prerogative granted to 
them by the treaties themselves’.23 
 
Viewed from this angle, the principle of institutional balance lies at the core of the 
European Union’s constitutional order.24 On the one hand, it captures the particularities 
of the EU’s idiosyncratic system that make it difficult for it to become tilted towards 
either unambiguous supranationalism or undiluted intergovernmentalism. On the other 
hand, the principle has clear implications for the conduct of the institutions in the 
legislative and executive sphere.  
 
And yet, the principle is not articulated in the Treaties expressly. It is ‘reflected’,25 
instead, in the provisions of Article 13(2) TEU that read as follows:  
                                                 
19 See, amongst others, Jacqué, ibid, P Craig, ‘Institutions, Power and Institutional Balance’ in P Craig 
and G de Burca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law 2nd ed (Oxford: OUP, 2011) 41, G Guillermin, ‘Le 
principe de l’équilibre institutionnel dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice des Communautés 
européennes’, (1992) Journal de droit International 319, B Smulders and K Eisele, ‘Reflections on the 
Institutional Balance, the Community Method and the Interplay between Jurisdictions after Lisbon”, 31 
YEL (2012) 112.  
20 Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council (re: Chernobyl) EU:C:1990:217, para. 21. 
21 Art. 5(1)-(2) TEU.  
22 Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council EU:C:1990:217, para. 22; also Case C-133/06 Parliament v 
Council EU:C:2008:257, para. 57. 
23 Case C-149/85 Wubot EU:C:1986:310, para. 23.    
24 Writing in 2000, De Witte pointed out that the Court had not referred to the institutional balance as a 
principle, and argued that to have done otherwise would have suggested an unwritten higher principle of 
an independent content: B De Witte, ‘The Role of Institutional Principles in the Judicial Development 
of the European Union Legal Order’ in F Snyder (ed.), The Europeanisation of Law: The legal effects of 
European integration (Hart Publishing, 2000) 83 at 92. Recent case refers expressly to the principle of 
institutional balance: see, for instance, Case C-63/12 Commission v Parliament EU:C:2013:752 at para. 
73 and Case C-73/14 Council v Commission (re: ITLOS) EU:C:2015:663 at para. 61. 25  Case C-73/14 Council v Commission (re: ITLOS) EU:C:2015:490, para. 461, Case C-425/13 
Commission v Council EU:C:2015:483, para. 69, and Case C-660/13 Council v Commission 
EU:C:2016:616, para. 32.  
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Each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties, and in 
conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in in them. The institutions 
shall practice mutual sincere cooperation.  
 
While the first sentence of the first limb had been part of primary law,26 the second was 
added at Lisbon. This new formulation illustrates the wide scope of the principle and 
its intense impact on the construction of institutional powers. After all, the power-
conferring provisions of the Treaties are not so clearly drafted as to provide certainty 
about the outer limits of what the institutions may do. The principle of institutional 
balance, therefore, provides the overall framework within which institutional powers 
are defined. As such, Article 13(2) TEU articulates a richer and more elaborate take on 
the principle.27 This is confirmed by the reference to sincere cooperation, which brings 
us to the second theme of this analysis.  
 
The notion of ‘mutual sincere cooperation’ refers to the duty of cooperation that has 
been part of the Union’s primary law since the establishment of the European Economic 
Community. The latter duty, however, was construed in the Treaties in relation to the 
conduct of the Member States. It is in those terms that the duty is set out in Article 4(3) 
TEU and its precursors.28 It is also in that context that a solid body of case-law has 
elaborated on the implications of the principle for the Member States in numerous legal 
fields and has elevated it to a central aspect of the constitutionalisation process of the 
EU legal order.29 Over the years, the Court of Justice has made it clear that the duty of 
cooperation also applies to the EU institutions.30  
 
It is for the first time, however, that this dimension of sincere cooperation is enshrined 
in primary law. In fact, Article 13(2) TEU not only formalises the application of the 
duty of cooperation to institutional interactions, but it also brings it together with the 
principle of institutional balance. As a matter of policy, it would be difficult to envisage 
the latter without due regard to the former. After all, there is an elusive quality to the 
principle of institutional balance: it is not the sharp sword which would delineate with 
clarity and in advance the limits of institutional powers. The inherent uncertainties, 
therefore, of the principle are modulated in practice by how the institutions relate to 
each other. The way, therefore, Article 13(2) TEU brings these two principles together 
suggests that they amount to an indissoluble whole, as, in order to be consistent with 
the constitutional character of the EU legal order, the implementation of the principle 
of institutional balance requires compliance with the duty of cooperation.  
 
Whilst, however, their significance is in no doubt, the definition of what compliance 
with the above principles would entail is hardly straightforward. It is not easy to 
ascertain how the opaque wording of Article 13(2) TEU would constrain the inherent 
                                                 
26 Ex Art. 7(1) EC.  
27 See C Hillion, ‘Conferral, cooperation and balance in the institutional framework of the EU external 
action’ in M Cremona (ed.), Structural Principles in EU External Relations Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2018) 117 at 125. 
28 Art. 4(3) TEU articulates the duty in stronger terms that its precursor (Art. 10 EC).  
29 See the analysis in M Klamert, The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law (OUP, 2014). 
30 Case C-65/93 European Parliament v Council (re: GTP) EU:C:1995:91 at para. 23. See also Case 
204/86 Greece v Council EU:C:1988:450, para. 16, and C‑65/93 Parliament v Council EU:C:1995:91, 
paras 23 and 27. 
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tendency of any institution to increase its powers either boldly or gradually and 
imperceptibly. This is hardly surprising in itself, given the nature of the Union’s 
Treaties as traité cadre. The formulation of Article 13 TEU(2) TEU, therefore, reflects 
the somewhat elusive quality of both the principle of institutional balance and the duty 
of cooperation.31 It also has implications for the conduct of the institutions. On the one 
hand, what the principle of institutional balance means would depend, to a considerable 
extent, on the wording of the specific primary rules defining the powers of the 
institutions in specific policy areas. On the other hand, its elusive quality provides a 
degree of flexibility so that its elaboration in practice would also depend on policy 
considerations, in particular the willingness of institutions to test the limits of their 
powers and the shifting dynamics that may characterise their interactions at a given 
time. 
 
Exploring the themes of institutional balance and the duty of cooperation in the context 
of treaty-making will shed light no only on how the Union’s decision-making actors 
relate to each other, but also on the role of the Court of Justice. It is a truism that the 
Court has been central to the genesis and development of the EU’s external relations 
law in general and the principle of duty of cooperation in particular.32 The emphasis on 
the latter has been somewhat one-dimensional, as the case-law deals with it in the 
context of the relationship between the EU and the Member States. The disputes in Mox 
Plant,33 PFOS,34 and Case C-45/07 Commission v Greece (IMO)35 and the attention 
they provoked 36 focus on the Court’s role in reading into the duty of cooperation 
rigorous duties for the Member States.  
 
The focus of this article will enable us to explore another dimension of the role of the 
Court, that is its approach to the interactions of the EU’s instittions in the treaty-making 
process. The analysis of this dimension is timely. On the one hand, the new formulation 
of Article 13(2) TEU at Lisbon has brought the inter-institutional dimension of the 
principle to the fore and has enabled the Court to rule on the specific duties that it 
imposes on the institutions. 37  On the other hand, the opaque formulation of this 
provision underlines the central role of the Union’s Judges in the elucidation of both 
principles. Finally, there is now a body of post-Lisbon case-law which provides a timely 
and useful point of reference against which to assess the Court’s role in the area.  
 
The analysis will examine how the above two themes play out in the case-law that has 
emerged from the different phases of the life cycle of international treaties, that is from 
the negotiation to the signing, the provisional application and their conclusion. How 
                                                 
31  See T Christiansen, ‘The European Union after the Lisbon Treaty: An Elusive “Institutional 
Balance”?’ in A Biondi and P Eeckhout (eds), EU Law After Lisbon (OUP, 2012) 228. 32 See Cremona and Thies (eds), n10 above and De Baere and Koutrakos, n13 above, 243. 
33 Case C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland EU:C:2006:34. 
34 Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden EU:C:2010:203. 
35 ECLI:EU:C:2009:81. 
36 See A Delgado Casteleiro and J Larik, ‘The Duty to Remain Silent: Limitless Loyalty in EU External 
Relations’, (2011) 36 ELRev 524, C Hillion, ‘Mixity and Coherence in EU External Relations: The 
Significance of the Duty of Cooperation’ in Hillion and Koutrakos (eds), n15 above, 87, P Koutrakos, 
‘In Search of a Voice: EU law constraints on member states in international law-making’ in R Liivoja 
and J Petman (eds), International Law-Making – Essays in Honour of Jan Klabbers (Routledge, 2014) 
211, and E Neframi, ‘The Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its Scope through its Application in the Field of 
EU External Relations’, (2010) 45 CMLRev 331. 
37 See Hillion, n27 above, 135 et seq. 
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has the principle of institutional balance affected the content and intensity of the 
interactions between the institutions in treaty-making? Does its construction by the 
Court of Justice favour specific functions and institutions? What role has the duty of 
co-operation played in the application of institutional balance? And has the Court of 
Justice approached these two themes in an interventionist manner, therefore reflecting 
the tenor of its constitutional case-law on external competence? In addressing the above 
questions, this article will tease out common threads in the case-law and will analyse 
them in the post-Lisbon constitutional context.  
 
3. Negotiating international treaties  
 
The power to negotiate on behalf of the EU is bestowed by primary law depending on 
the subject-matter of the agreement to be negotiated. Article 218(3) TFEU refers to the 
Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, the latter responsible for the negotiation of agreements which relate exclusively 
or principally to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP).38 The negotiation of 
an international agreement is carried out pursuant to negotiating directives which are 
adopted by the Council under Article 218(2) TFEU. Article 218(4) TFEU also provides 
that the Council ‘may address directives to the negotiator and designate a special 
committee in consultation with which the negotiations must be conducted’.  
 
The principle of institutional balance does not provide an easy yardstick which would 
enable the institutions to be confident about how to interact in carrying out the above 
functions. On the one hand, the right to negotiate is an important power that establishes 
the Commission’s ‘pre-eminent role in any negotiation’.39 It is also tied in with the 
general role assigned to the Commission under Article 17(1) TEU which provides that, 
‘[w]ith the exception of the common foreign and security policy, and other cases 
provided for in the Treaties, [the Commission] shall ensure the Union's external 
representation’. On the other hand, the dividing line between the Council’s authorising 
and the Commission’s negotiating roles is not clear. Construed widely, the latter may 
test the limits of the Council’s negotiating directives; understood narrowly, they may 
deprive the Commission of any leeway and authority that an effective negotiator would 
require in order to carry out their role effectively.   
 
In Case C-425/13 Commission v Council, a case about the negotiation of an EU-
Australia Agreement aiming to introduce a mutual recognition mechanism for trading 
greenhouse gas emission allowances, 40 the Court stressed the balance between the 
above tasks allocated to the EU institutions: the negotiating role of the Commission 
should be meaningful, the special committee ought to be ‘in a position to formulate 
                                                 
38 Art. 218(3) TFEU also refers to ‘the Union’s negotiating team’ which may relate to agreements the 
subject-matter of which would fall within the scope of both the CFSP and other strands of the EU’s 
external action. 
39 I MacLeod, ID Hendry and S Hyett, The External Relations of the European Communities (OUP, 
1996) 88. The significance of this power has become all the more apparent in the context of the Brexit 
negotiations under Art. 50 TEU (the Council’s negotiating directives of 22 May 2017 for the withdrawal 
agreement are available here: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21766/directives-for-the-
negotiation-xt21016-ad01re02en17.pdf, and for the transitional period here: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu//media/32504/xt21004-ad01re02en18.pdf).  
40 EU:C:2015:483. Such agreements are envisaged in Art. 25 of Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community [2003] OJ L 275/32,  amended by Directive 2009/29/EC [2009] OJ L 140/63. 
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opinions and advice relating to the negotiations’ and, ultimately, the Council ought to 
have ‘clear knowledge of the course of the negotiations concerning the preparation of 
a draft agreement that will be submitted to it for approval’.41  
 
Against this context, compliance with the principle of institutional balance is ensured 
by a set of strong procedural mechanisms. The Council has the right to set out in the 
negotiating directives a set of arrangements governing the process for the provision of 
information, for communication and for consultation, and to impose on the Commission 
a rigorous reporting obligation (in writing, on the outcome of the negotiations after each 
negotiating session and, in any event, at least quarterly). In so far as the directives were 
not ‘liable to deny the negotiator the power which is granted in Article 17(1) TEU’,42 
they could impose on the Commission a wide set of obligations: to have the negotiations 
prepared for well in advance; to inform the Council of the schedule anticipated and the 
issues to be negotiated, to forward relevant documents as early as possible, to report to 
the Council on the outcome of the negotiations after each negotiating session and, in 
any event, at least quarterly, to inform on any major problem that may arise during the 
negotiations, to obtain prior authorization from the special committee for seeking 
guidance on specific technical aspects of the negotiations.  
 
There is, however, a limit on the obligations that could be imposed on the Commission: 
the negotiating directives could not bestow on the special committee and the Council 
the right to establish ‘detailed negotiating positions’. As these would seek ‘to bind the 
negotiator’,43 they would be contrary to the role that Article 218(4) TFEU assigned to 
the relevant actors: they would go ‘beyond the consultative function’ of the special 
committee, and would ‘invest’ the Council ‘with the power to impose “detailed 
negotiating positions” on the negotiator’.44  
 
This is a measured reading of what the principle of institutional balance entails in the 
negotiations of international agreements. Whilst adopting a broad approach to 
information-sharing and reporting, the Court stopped short of impinging upon the 
negotiating power of the Commission, and rejected what would amount to constant and 
ad hoc binding constraints that are not envisaged in Article 218 TFEU. After all, were 
the possibility of the adoption of detailed negotiating positions by the special committee 
accepted, the latter could, in effect, amend the negotiating directives.45  
 
This approach also deems institutional balance as intrinsically linked to the duty of 
sincere cooperation. Whilst the latter is only spelled out at the beginning of the 
judgment, it clearly informs the specific procedural interactions between the institutions 
that the Court examines. The duty of cooperation, therefore, provides the filter through 
which compliance with the principle of institutional balance would become feasible in 
practice. As such, it is difficult to disentangle it from that principle. This view is faithful 
to the reading of Article 13(2) TEU articulated in Section 2 above.  
 
In adopting this approach, the judgment focuses on the specifics of the negotiations and 
is devoid of general statements about the role of the institutions. This is in contrast to 
                                                 
41 Paras 66 and 67 of the judgment respectively. 
42 Para. 79 of the judgment.  
43 Para. 86 of the judgment.  
44 Paras 89 and 90 of the judgment respectively.  
45 This point is made by AG Wathelet in para, 105 of his Opinion (EU:C:2015:174).  
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the Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet who had put forward a somewhat abstract 
and one-dimensional analysis in order to reject a purely technical role for the 
Commission by relying on the Union’s interest.46 For all the force of his analysis, 
however, the learned Advocate General did not show how, in practical terms, the 
specific reporting requirements would impinge upon the Commission’s negotiating 
role.  
 
This construction of the principle of institutional balance and the duty of cooperation 
reflects a sense of pragmatism. The introduction of a detailed, formalized and enhanced 
reporting obligation for the Commission would have internal and external benefits: it 
would contribute to rigorous communication with the special committee and the 
Council, and, ultimately, to the smooth process of the negotiation and signing of 
international agreements. This aspect of the negotiations becomes clearer if viewed 
against a specific policy concern, that is to ensure that the Commission would not take 
initiatives beyond the authority granted by the Council and which might not be 
sanctioned by the Member States. This concern was borne out by previous incidents, 
such as the Blair House Agreement that the Commission negotiated with the United 
States in 1992, and the Framework Agreement on Bananas in 1994.47 Furthermore, the 
Council sought to avoid a repeat of the negotiation of a similar agreement with 
Switzerland, during which it had viewed the Commission’s engagement in consultation 
as considerably lacking both in terms of frequency of meetings and content of 
information provided to the special committee. Viewed from this angle, the strong 
procedural dimension of the interactions between the institutions required by the Court 
addresses a practical issue of considerable significance for the Council and the Member 
States.  
 
4. Signing non-binding agreements  
 
The authority to sign binding international agreements rests with the Council and is 
exercised following a proposal by the Commission under Article 218(5) TFEU. By 
signing such an agreement, the EU is bound by international law not to engage in acts 
or omissions that would defeat the object and purpose of the agreement. 48  This 
authority amounts to a significant power that the Council guards zealously. The TFEU, 
however, does not set out any decision-making mechanism specifically for non-binding 
agreements. 49  In Case C-233/02 France v Commission, the Court held that the 
determination of which institution had the power to adopt a non-binding agreement 
ought to be made on the basis of the division of powers and the institutional balance 
established in the Treaties.50  
 
And yet, given the silence in the Treaties, compliance with the principle of institutional 
balance is complicated by the allocation of tasks to the EU institutions that may appear 
to overlap. The broad terms in which these tasks are set out do not help. On the one 
hand, and in addition to its general power to ‘carry out policy-making and coordinating 
functions as laid down in the Treaties’ pursuant to Article 16(1) TEU, the Council has 
                                                 
46 EU:C:2015:174, paras 193 and 126.  
47 See the overview in P Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law 2nd ed (Oxford: OUP, 2011), 197-9. 
48 See Art. 18(a) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See also Case T-115/94 Opel Austria v 
Council EU:T:1997:3, paras 90-95.   49 Given the lack of binding effect, they are not governed by Article 218 TFEU. 
50 EU:C:2004:173, para. 40.  
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a specific external relations function: in its Foreign Affairs formation, it has the power 
‘to elaborate the Union's external action on the basis of strategic guidelines laid down 
by the European Council and ensure that the Union's action is consistent’ under Article 
16(6) TEU. On the other hand, the Commission is entrusted under Article 17(1) TFEU 
with the task of ‘promot[ing] the general interest of the Union and tak[ing]appropriate 
initiatives to that end’ as well as ‘exercis[ing] coordinating, executive and management 
functions, as laid down in the Treaties’.  
 
The Commission’s power of external representation under Article 17(1) TEU does not 
amount to the power to sign a non-binding agreement. This was the conclusion reached 
in Case C-660/13 Council v Commission, a case about a 2013 addendum to a non-
binding EU-Switzerland Memorandum of Understanding regarding the latter’s 
financial contribution to Member States in exchange for access to the EU’s single 
market.51  
 
Its approach to the principle of institutional balance highlights further the sense of 
pragmatism that we have already seen in the context of the negotiations of international 
agreements (Section 3). Here, a decision to sign non-binding agreements is tied in with 
a policy assessment. The latter should be made ‘in compliance with strategic guidelines 
laid down by the European Council and the principles and objectives of the Union’s 
external action laid down in Article 21(1) and (2) TEU, of the Union’s interests in the 
context of its relations with the third country concerned, and the divergent interests 
arising in those relations to be reconciled’.52 As such a policy assessment is for the 
Council to make, in accordance with Article 16(1) and (6) TEU, it is also for the Council 
to sign non-binding agreements.53 This emphasis on the policy underpinnings of the 
power to sign a non-binding agreement was borne out by the factual context of the 
dispute: the agreement in question referred to the amount of the Swiss contribution and 
its duration, both of which were ‘essential aspects of the Union’s policy making’ in the 
area.54  
 
The judgment in EU-Switzerland MoU sheds light on how the Court approaches the 
position of the principle of institutional balance in relation to other constitutional 
principles governing treaty-making, namely that of conferral and the duty of 
cooperation. The inherent linkages between institutional balance and conferral were 
mentioned above in Section 2. The Court assumes that the violation of the former 
entails a violation of the latter.55 This explains the economy of the EU-Switzerland 
MoU judgment, a characteristic that also explains the silence on the duty of cooperation: 
there is no scope for examining how an EU institution has exercised a power with which 
it has not been endowed under primary law.  
 
                                                 
51 EU:C:2016:616. 
52 Ibid, para. 39. 
53 The judgment suggests that the Council could in fact authorize the Commission to sign a non-binding 
agreement (para. 43). This is also the Council’s position: Doc. No. 5707/13, Council Legal Service 
Opinion on the procedure to be followed for the conclusion by the EU of Memoranda of Understanding, 
Joint Statements and other texts containing policy commitments, with third countries and international 
organizations (Brussels, 1 Feb. 2013), para 12. 
54 Para. 45 of the judgment. As AG Sharpston pointed out in her Opinion, this information had not, in 
fact, been laid down in the 2012 Conclusions and, therefore, the 2013 addendum did not correspond to 
these fully.  55 EU:C:2016:616, para. 53. 
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The Court’s take on institutional balance in EU-Switzerland MoU introduces a degree 
of symmetry in treaty-making. In does so in two ways. First, it links the decision to sign 
a non-binding agreement with the decision to authorise its negotiation. The former does 
not emerge in a legal and policy vacuum. It follows, instead, from a Council 
authorization. Given that the Council’s assessment of the EU’s policy requirements is 
the source for the negotiation of an agreement, it would be paradoxical if the Council 
was not involved in the signature of that agreement. This is even more so in the light of 
the significance of the power to sign agreements for this institution’s standing in EU 
external relations. The policy choice as to whether the content of an agreement 
negotiated by the Commission would be acceptable for the Union is central to this 
power.  
 
Second, the above approach to institutional balance alludes to a symmetry with the 
procedures laid down in Article 218 TFEU which endow the Council with the power to 
sign international agreements. The lack of any emphasis in the judgment on the nature 
of the Addendum to the Memorandum of Understanding as a non-binding measure, for 
instance, is noteworthy. Given the increasing significance of non-binding agreements 
in international relations,56 such symmetry is justified in practical terms. Furthermore, 
this approach is faithful to the general scheme of the allocation of tasks to the EU 
institutions. Had a power to sign non-binding agreements been conferred on the 
Commission in the absence of an express provision to that effect, the Court would have 
elevated the status of the Commission in EU external relations in a manner that would 
be incompatible with the institutional structure that shapes the Union’s external action.  
 
5. Authorising the signature and provisional application of international 
agreements  
 
The limits of the principle of institutional balance and the duty of cooperation in the 
context of treaty-making are tested directly by hybrid decisions. These are adopted by 
both the Council and the Representatives of the Member States meeting within the 
Council in order to authorise the signature and, where necessary, the provisional 
application international agreements. As mentioned above, this power rests with the 
Council under Article 215(5) TFEU and is exercised, in principle, by qualified majority 
voting (Article 218(8) TFEU). Hybrid decisions have relied upon, albeit infrequently, 
in EU external relations, recently for the signing and provisional application of various 
air transport agreements.57 They have also been relied upon in other policy areas in the 
                                                 
56 See A Schafer, ‘Resolving Deadlock: Why International Organisations Introduce Soft Law’, (2006) 
12 ELJ 194. For the use of soft law instruments in the European Neighbourhood Policy in particular, see 
B Van Vooren, ‘Soft Law in EU External Relations: The European Neighbourhood Policy’, (2009) 34 
ELRev 696. 
57 See Dec. 2013/398/EU re: Euro-Mediterranean Aviation Agreement with Israel [2013] OJ L 208/1, 
Dec. 2012/639/EU re: the Common Aviation Area Agreement with Moldova [2012] OJ L 292/1, Dec. 
2012/708/EU re: Common Aviation Area Agreement with Georgia [2012] OJ L 321/1, Dec. 
2012/750/EU re: Euro-Mediterranean Aviation Agreement with Jordan [2012] 334/1, Dec. 2006/959/EC 
re: Euro-Mediterranean Aviation Agreement with Morocco ‘2006] OJ L 386/55.  
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past,58 and, in the distant past, even more sparingly on the internal plane.59 On the one 
hand, this practice may appear to run counter to the principle of institutional balance, 
as it may encroach upon the decision-making powers granted to the Council under 
primary law. On the other hand, it may illustrate a specific application of the duty of 
cooperation which would facilitate the Union’s action along with that of the Member 
States.  
 
The adoption of hybrid decisions has now been held to violate the principle of 
institutional balance. This is what the Grand Chamber decided in Case C-28/12 
Commission v Council.60 This case arose in the dense context of the 2007 air transport 
agreement between the EU and its Member States and the United States of America,61 
in particular a hybrid decision on the signing and provisional application of two 
agreements: the first extended the 2007 agreement to Norway and Iceland,62 and the 
second was about the Commission representing Iceland and Norway in any issues that 
arose from the implementation of the 2007 agreement.  
 
The Court’s approach to institutional balance is based on the premise that, when it 
comes to treaty-making, procedures laid down in primary law matter, and the Court is 
prepared to enforce them rigorously. A hybrid decision is adopted pursuant to a single 
procedure, even though the issues covered by the contested decision ought to have been 
dealt with on the basis of different procedures: the signing and provisional application 
of the agreements on behalf of the EU is decided, in principle, by qualified majority 
voting in the Council under Article 218(8) TFEU, whereas the provisional application 
of the agreements by the Member States is subject to consensus of their representatives. 
The significance that the Court attaches to procedural propriety is illustrated strikingly 
by the following extract from the judgment: ‘the rules regarding the manner in which 
the EU institutions arrive at their decisions are laid down in the Treaties and are not at 
the disposal of the Member States or of the institutions themselves.’63 
 
The procedural anomaly that is pointed out in the judgment is tied in with a violation 
of the principle of conferral. Given that the hybrid decision ‘in fact merges two different 
acts … without it being possible to discern which act reflects the will of the Council 
and which the will of the Member States’,64 the EU institutions end up exercising a 
power they do not have. This is also the case for the Member States, as Article 218(5) 
                                                 58 See Dec. 91/586/ECSC, EEC suspending the application of the Agreements between the EC, its 
Member States and Yugoslavia [1991] OJ L 315/47 and Dec. 76/755/ECSC, EEC, Euratom on 
practical measures of economic cooperation within the EC-Canada Joint Committee [1976] OJ L 
260/36. 
59 See Dec. 90/238/Euratom, ECSC, EEC adopting a 1900 to 1994 action plan in the context of the 
‘Europe against Cancer’ programme [1990] OJ L 137/31, Dec. 88/351/EEC adopting a 1988 to 1989 
plan of action for an information and public awareness campaign in the context of the ‘Europe against 
cancer’ programme [1988] OJ L 160/52, Dec. 77/294/EEC adopting the fourth medium economic policy 
programme [1977] OJ L 101/1, 
60 EU:C:2015:282. They had also been raised in Case C-114/12 Commission v Council (re: broadcasting 
rights) EU:C:2014:2151, but the Court did not examine them, as it held that the contested measure was 
illegal because it violated the Union’s exclusive competence (AG Sharpston, however, analysed them:  
EU:C:2014:224, paras 167 et seq). 
61 [2007] OJ L 134/4, amended by a Protocol in 2010 ([2010] OJ L 223/3). 
62 [2011] OJ L 283/3. 63 Case C-28/12, para. 42.  
64 Para. 49 of the judgment.  
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TFEU does not confer any competence on Member States to adopt a decision on the 
signing and provisional application by the EU of an international agreement. 
 
By objecting to the fusion of different procedures and the ensuing lack of clarity as to 
which actor does what and on the basis of which power, the judgment is entirely 
consistent with other strands of the case-law. In relation to legal basis disputes, for 
instance, the Court is distinctly reluctant to sanction reliance upon more than one legal 
bases which would entail different procedures, an approach that, at times, gives rise to 
a somewhat esoteric assessment of the aims, context, and content of an international 
agreement.65 The parallel between the problems raised by hybrid decisions and legal 
basis disputes is illustrated by the reasoning in Case C-28/12  Hybrid Decisions, as the 
authority it provides ‘by analogy’ in this part of the judgment is itself a legal basis 
case.66  
 
This emphasis on the rigorous enforcement of the procedural rules laid down in Article 
218 TFEU may explain the cursory manner in which the Court held in the Hybrid 
Decisions judgment that the adoption of a hybrid decision may not constitute a specific 
illustration of the duty of cooperation between the EU institutions and the Member 
States: ‘that principle cannot justify the Council setting itself free from compliance with 
the procedural rules and voting arrangements laid down in in Article 218 TFEU’.67 
There is no reference, for instance, to the alternatives that would be open to the EU and 
the Member States in order to deal with the practical problems raised by their joint 
participation. Such alternatives had been discussed at the hearing and examined by 
Advocate General Mengozzi. They included the simultaneous adoption of two separate 
decisions, one by the Council and the other by the Representatives of the Member 
States,68 or a decision adopted solely by the Council.69  
 
Given the inherently open ended scope of the duty of cooperation, is the reluctance of 
the Court to put some flesh on the duty of cooperation bone regrettable?70 And does the 
judgment signify a shift away from facilitating joint EU-Member State external 
action?71 Such questions touch upon the proper role of the Court of Justice in such 
disputes. It is not for the Court either to make suggestions to the Union’s institutions 
about possible policy choices or to provide a list of specific alternatives as to how to 
deal with the complexities of the co-existence of the EU and the Member States on the 
international scene. Had it done so, it would have been viewed as steering dangerously 
                                                 
65 In the area of trade and environmental policy, see Case C-94/03 Commission v Council EU:C:2006:2, 
para. 51. See also Opinion 2/00 EU:C:2001:664 and Case C-281/01 Commission v Council 
EU:C:2002:761, analysed in P Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law 2nd ed (Hart Publishing 2015) 
54-67. This reluctance is also apparent in the areas of foreign policy and development cooperation: see 
Case C-130/10 European Parliament v Council EU:C:2012:472, para. 49. 66 Para. 52 of Case 28/12 Commission v Council EU:C:2015:282, with reference to Case C-338/01 
Commission v Council EU:C:2004:253. 
67 Para. 55 of the judgment.  
68 This option would not be without problems, given the intrinsic links between areas in transport 
agreements which fall within EU and national competence (AG Opinion, EU:C:2015:43, para.88). 
69 This had been suggested by the Commission and, according to AG Mengozzi, it was rather ‘sensitive’ 
as it would give rise to legal problems given the constitutional requirements in some Member States (AG 
Opinion, ibid).  
70 Dashwood argues that the judgment is characterized by ‘procedural purity’: n16 above at 248. He also 
suggests that careful drafting could address the concerns expressed in the judgment (ibid, at 244-5). 
71 T. Verellen, On hybrid decisions, mixed agreements and the limits of the new legal order: Commission 
v Council (“US Air Transport Agreement”), (2016) 53 CMLRev 741 at 741-2 and 748-753. 
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close to interfering with policy-making. In fact, such an approach would be tantamount 
to providing direction to the Member States as to how to exercise their competence, 
rather than merely establishing the parameters within which they may exercise it. Any 
court would be loath to do so. It would also have made it necessary for the Court to 
examine the scope of the Union’s competence, a discussion that is absent in the 
judgment. Any abstract analysis of what the duty of cooperation might entail in practice 
would be bound to disappoint: it would fail to capture the considerable range of 
possibilities on which the ingenuity of the legal services of the institutions and the 
Member States could rely. If, furthermore, taken out of context, it might lead to 
potentially problematic outcomes that were not envisaged at the time of the judgment.   
 
The above analysis may explain the economy that characterizes the judgment in EU-
Switzerland MoU. By focusing on the wording of specific provisions and the specific 
implications of the procedural aspects of the case, the Court avoids general 
pronouncements about hybrid decisions of the kind made by both the parties72 and 
Advocate General Mengozzi. 73  The judgment, instead, is based on the rigorous 
application of the primary rules on treaty-making within the specific legal and factual 
context of the dispute raised before the Court.  
 
6. The right of the European Parliament to be informed  
 
The strong procedural dimension that underpins the application of the principle of 
institutional balance in treaty-making regarding the Council-Commission interplay 
(identified in Section 3 above) also characterises the interactions between the 
Parliament and the other institutions. The opportunity for this to emerge was given by 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. By redrawing the EU’s institutional map in 
external relations, it enhanced considerably the powers of the European Parliament.74 
The latter’s consent is now necessary for the conclusion of most international 
agreements,75 a power that the Parliament has not shied away from exercising quite 
early on.76 The Lisbon Treaty also bestows on the Parliament a general right to be 
informed. Article 218(10) TFEU provides that the Parliament ‘shall be immediately 
and fully informed at all stages of the procedure’.  
 
This broad provision has been given teeth in two judgments about the EU’s  agreements 
with Mauritius (Case C-658/11 Parliament v Council)77 and Tanzania (Case C-263/14 
Parliament v Council). 78  Both agreements were about the transfer of individuals 
                                                 
72 The Commission had suggested that reliance upon hybrid decisions would blur the autonomy of the 
Union’s presence in international relations. 
73 AG Mengozzi had argued that hybrid decisions would, amongst others, be ‘liable to weaken the EU 
as a full player on the world stage’ (n68 above, para. 86). 
74 See B Kleizen, Mapping the involvement of the European Parliament in EU external relations-a legal 
and empirical analysis, (2016) CLEER Working Paper 4 and R Passos, ‘The European Union’s External 
Relations A Year after Lisbon: A First Evaluation from the European Parliament’ in Koutrakos (ed.), n9 
above, at 49. 
75 Art. 218(6)(a) TFEU.   
76 This has been the case regarding the EU-US SWIFT Agreement (EP legislative resolution of 11 
February 2010 [2010] OJ C 341 E/100), the renegotiation of PNR Agreements with Australia ([2012] OJ 
L 18/4), the United States ([2012] OJ L 174/1), and Canada (the conclusion of which the Court has 
recently found contrary to the Treaties: Opinion 1/15 EU:C:2016:656), and ACTA (EP legislative 
resolution of 4 July 2012 P7_TA (2012) 028). 
77 EU:C:2014:2025. 
78 EU:C:2016:435. 
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suspected of piracy at sea and arrested by EU personnel in the context of the anti-piracy 
operation Atalanta off the coast of Somalia. 79  It is worth-pointing out that these 
judgments were rendered in relation to the Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP), 
an area where the Parliament has no formal input and its only right is to be informed 
under Article 218(10) TFEU. 
 
This right amounts to ‘an expression of the democratic principles on which the 
European Union is founded’,80 and the Court left no doubt as to the significance of its 
implications:81  
 
If the Parliament is not immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure in 
accordance with Article 218(10) TFEU, including that preceding the conclusion of the 
agreement, it is not in a position to exercise the right of scrutiny which the Treaties have 
conferred on it in relation to the CFSP or, where appropriate, to make known its views as 
regards, in particular, the correct legal basis for the act concerned. The infringement of that 
information requirement impinges, in those circumstances, on the Parliament’s performance of 
its duties in relation to the CFSP, and therefore constitutes an infringement of an essential 
procedural requirement.  
 
In practical terms, this suggests that Article 218(10) TFEU applies to all stages that 
precede the conclusion of an international agreement, including the negotiation phase. 
Whilst the right to be informed does not extend to stages that are part of the internal 
preparatory process within the Council, it does cover the intermediate results reached 
by the negotiation, including the texts of the draft agreement and the draft decision 
approved by the Council’s Foreign Relations Counsellors and communicated to the 
Union’s interlocutors.  
 
This is a strong construction of the right to be informed. Given the factual context 
within which the dispute arose, it is also not surprising. It is staggering that the Council 
should have seriously argued in Case C-658/11 EU-Mauritius Agreement 82  that 
sending the Parliament the decision adopting an agreement three months later was 
reasonable. Or that the publication of the text of the agreement and the Council 
Decision concluding it in the Official Journal would have sufficed. While it suggested 
in EU-Tanzania that the word ‘immediately’ should not be taken literally (information 
delivered after a period of a few days may be acceptable at times),83 the Court pointed 
out that the Council had failed altogether to communicate the text.  
 
The Court’s interpretation of the right to be informed is not based expressly on the 
principle of institutional balance. The threads, however, that were identified above in 
the analysis of the principle emerge clearly. The Court’s approach suggests that the 
procedures on treaty-making laid down in primary law matter, a point highlighted 
above in the context of hybrid decisions (Section 5). Indeed, to have interpreted Article 
218(10) TFEU differently would have been tantamount to rendering it irrelevant. Such 
a view would also have been difficult to sustain in the broader scheme of the Union’s 
                                                 
79 On the issues raised by such transfer agreements, see D Thym, ‘Piracy and Transfer Agreements 
concluded by the EU’, in P Koutrakos and A Skordas (eds), The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea—EU 
and International Perspectives, (Hart Publishing, 2013) 167. 
80 Case C-658/11 European Parliament v Council, para. 81. 
81 Ibid, para. 86. 
82 EU:C:2014:2025. 
83 EU:C:2016:435, para. 82.  
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treaty-making. Given the enhanced position of the Parliament and its willingness to use 
the powers with which it is endowed under the Lisbon Treaty in the conclusion of most 
other international agreements, to cut it off from information related to CFSP 
agreements would be counterproductive and detrimental to the smooth interactions 
between the institutions in other fields of external relations. In other words, to have 
encouraged the reluctance of the other institutions to engage with the Parliament in 
CFSP agreements would have risked a breakdown in inter-institutional relations in a 
policy area that can ill afford it. Viewed from this angle, the broad construction of the 
right to be informed under Article 218(10) TFEU also illustrates a good deal of 
pragmatism.  
 
7. A similar approach to institutional balance and the duty of cooperation in the 
implementation of treaties  
 
The analysis so far has focused on how the principle of institutional balance and the 
duty of cooperation play out in the context of treaty-making. Once the treaty-making 
process has been completed, and the international agreement has entered into force, 
these principles are still relevant to the interaction between the institutions. In fact, the 
process of implementation may raise issues similar to those examined in the analysis 
so far. This has become apparent recently in the context of Article 218 (9) TFEU. This 
provision reads as follows: 
 
The Council, on a proposal from the Commission or the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall adopt a decision suspending application of an 
agreement and establishing the positions to be adopted on the Union's behalf in a body set up 
by an agreement, when that body is called upon to adopt acts having legal effects, with the 
exception of acts supplementing or amending the institutional framework of the agreement. 
 
A detailed analysis of this provision is beyond the scope of this article.84 This section 
will tease out, instead, certain aspects from recent case-law that confirm our analysis of 
the Court’s approach to institutional balance and the duty of cooperation.  
 
The Court has recently highlighted the significance of Article 218(9) TFEU in the 
decision-making practice of the Union’s institutions. In Case C-687/15 Commission v 
Council (International Telecommunication Union, ITU), the Council set out the 
position that the EU would take at a meeting of the World Radiocommunication 
Conference 2015 of the International Telecommunicaiton Union (ITU).85 Consistently 
with its practice in the context of ITU for a number of years, the Council did so in the 
conclusions of its meeting, rather than a decision under Article 218(9) TFEU. The 
Grand Chamber, however, held that, in doing so, the Council had infringed the latter 
provision. Having relied upon the limits of the powers of the institutions and the 
principle of institutional balance reflected in Article 13(2) TEU, the Court pointed out 
that the Union’s institutions do not enjoy any power to amend the decision-making 
procedures laid down in the Treaties. Failure to comply with Article 218(9) TFEU did 
not only amount to the exercise of a power that the Council did not possess under 
primary law, but it also gave rise to uncertainty as to the legal nature and scope of the 
measure actually adopted by the institution.  
 
                                                 
84 See Dashwood, n16 above at 227-246.  85 EU:C:2017:803. 
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The ITU judgment illustrates a literal interpretation of the Treaty-based decision-
making procedure which links the application of the latter with respect for the principle 
of institutional balance. We find this literal interpretation in relation not only to what 
falls within the scope of Article 218(9) TFEU, but also beyond it. A case in point is the 
Court’s approach to the question who decides the Union’s position before a tribunal 
established under an international agreement in which the EU is a party. On the one 
hand, Council argues that it has the power to adopt such a decision pursuant to Article 
218(9) TFEU. On the other hand, the Commission claims that the right to decide the 
EU’s position in a tribunal established under an international agreement in which the 
EU is a party is part of the general power to represent the EU with which it is endowed 
under Article 335 TFEU.86 
 
These competing claims raise an issue ‘of cardinal importance’87 which was addressed 
for the first time in Case C-73/14 Council v Commission (re: ITLOS) in the context of 
the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), 
established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).88 
The Court held that it was for the Commission to represent the EU in such proceedings. 
Article 218(9) TFEU is confined to cases where the EU participates, either through its 
institutions or its Member States acting jointly in its interests, in the adoption of acts 
having legal effects. This is the not case regarding ITLOS, ‘an international judicial 
body’ the members of which are ‘solely’ responsible for rendering the advisory opinion 
in question ‘acting wholly independently of the parties’.89 The interpretation was borne 
out by the wording of Article 218(9) TFEU (it refers to positions adopted ‘in’ rather 
than ‘before’ a body set up by an international agreement), as well as its context and 
purpose (the simplified procedure laid down therein amounts to a derogation from the 
ordinary procedure about treaty-making set out in Article 218(1)-(8) TFEU).  
 
As Article 218(9) TFEU is not applicable, the power of the Commission under Article 
335 TFEU is triggered. This is construed broadly: it is related to the legal capacity of 
the EU, and covers representation both internally (that is in the Member States) and 
externally (hence before ITLOS).  
 
As for the duty of cooperation, its construction follows the pattern that was examined 
above in the article. On the one hand, the duty may not displace the role of the 
institutions granted under primary law (which is why the Commission is under no 
obligation to submit the content of its written statement to the Council for its approval).  
On the other hand, there is a procedural layer on how the Commission is  expected to 
exercise its power (it has to consult the Council prior to expressing the EU’s position 
before an international tribunal). In the judgment, the Court engaged closely with the 
facts in order to conclude that the duty of cooperation had been complied with: the 
Commission had submitted a working document to the Council and had revised it 
several times, whilst ensuring that the final version referred to the issue of the 
                                                 
86 It reads as follows: ‘In each of the Member States, the Union shall enjoy the most extensive legal 
capacity accorded to legal persons under their laws; it may, in particular, acquire or dispose of movable 
and immovable property and may be a party to legal proceedings. To this end, the Union shall be 
represented by the Commission….’.  
87 AG Sharpston in her Opinion in Case C-73/14 Council v Commission (re: ITLOS) EU:C:2015:490, 
para. 49. 
88 EU:C:2015:663. 
89 Case C-73/14, para. 66.  
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jurisdiction of ITLOS in neutral terms in order to take into account the divergent views 
expressed by various Member States within the Council.  
 
There are, therefore, threads that bring together the application of the principle of 
institutional balance and the duty of cooperation in the treaty-making process and the 
implementation of international agreements. This is also apparent in the style of the 
judgment. The line of reasoning is characterised by considerable economy. There is 
very little here about the Union’s external competence, other than the agreement by all 
parties, acknowledged by the Court, that the subject matter of the request for an 
advisory opinion is about, ‘at least in part’, the conservation of marine biological 
resources, an area which falls within the EU’s exclusive competence under Article 
3(1)(d) TFEU.90 There is also emphasis on the wording of Article 218(9) TFEU and a 
lack of general pronouncements about the role of the Commission in the EU’s external 
relations or the practical and policy imperatives that the Commission’s power would 
meet.91  
 
In addition to the above threads, the judgment in ITLOS illustrates a broader point about 
the principle of institutional balance, namely its inherent limits as a clear rule on the 
allocation of tasks between institutions. A main tenet of the Court’s line of reasoning 
is the distinction between policy-making and interventions in judicial proceedings: the 
submission of observations before ITLOS did not aim ‘to formulate a policy … but to 
present to ITLOS, on the basis of an analysis of the provisions of international and EU 
law relevant to that subject, a set of legal observations aimed at enabling that court to 
give, if appropriate, an informed advisory opinion on the questions put to it’.92 There 
is, however, very little by way of reasoning about the distinction between policy-
making and decisions on ITLOS proceedings in the judgment. Similarly, the concerns 
of the Council about the content of the Commission’s statement (viewed as related to 
strategic or political choices about the ITLOS jurisdiction which were for the Council 
to make) and its wider political consequences were dismissed rather too swiftly. The 
Court, instead, held that those considerations were ‘characteristic of participation 
before a court’ and could not be regarded as policy-making within the meaning of 
Article 16(1) TEU.93  
 
The subject-matter of the specific proceedings before ITLOS may justify the conclusion 
reached in the judgment. These were brought in the context of the application of 
UNCLOS and the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, an area where there is a 
considerable body of EU secondary legislation.94 Viewed from this angle, it is not 
                                                 
90 Case C-73/14, para. 55. This was also the position taken by AG Sharpston, who considered the 
question whether the determination of the jurisdiction of ITLOS to deliver advisory opinions was a matter 
exclusively for the Member States or not irrelevant (Case C-73/14 Council v Commission 
EU:C:2015:490 paras 51-2 of her Opinion).  
91 This is contrast to AG Sharpston who had argued that a broader construction of Article 218(9) TFEU 
would impinge on the Commission’s discretion to lodge and participate in WTO proceedings and would 
undermine the EU’s ability to meet the strict procedural time limits laid down for international legal 
proceedings (EU:C:2015:490, para. 78). 
92 Case C-73/14, para. 71. 
93 Case C-73/14 Council v Commission EU:C:2015:663,para. 72-4.  94 Including Regulation 1005/2008 on a system of rules and procedures aiming to prevent, deter, and 
eliminate IIU fishing [2008] OJ L 286/1, Regulation 1006/2008 on the authorization of fishing activities 
by EU vessels outside EU waters and the access of third country vessels to EU waters [2008] OJ L 
286/33, Regulation 1224/2009 on the enforcement of the above rules by setting out an EU control system 
[2009] OJ L 343/1. 
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difficult to distinguish between policy-making (for which the Council is responsible 
under Article 16(1) TFEU) and representing the Union in international judicial 
proceedings (for which the Commission is responsible under Article 335 TFEU). This 
point, however, is not made clear in the judgment. And it by no means follows that the 
distinction between representation in international judicial proceedings and policy-
making would be as tidy in any legal context as the judgment presents it here. After all, 
whilst more common than they used to be, proceedings before international judicial 
bodies are often policy-charged affairs which involve deeply politicized positions from 
the parties. Such positions may have repercussion for the broader standing of the parties 
in the organization.95 This point was acknowledged by Advocate General Sharpston 
whose Opinion suggested a more thoughtful approach: whilst she concluded that 
participation in international judicial proceedings amounts ‘in most cases’ to 
representing prior policy choices, she was also ‘reluctant to accept that this will always 
be the case’.96 She added:  
 
Thus, it is not unforeseeable that, in the context of international judicial proceedings in which 
the EU has standing, the EU might need to take a position on an issue that is not yet covered 
either by existing EU commitments under international law which are to be interpreted (and 
applied) in those proceedings or by any other rules of international law on which the EU has 
already taken a position. In such circumstances, the Council’s prerogatives would need to be 
respected.  
 
The quest, therefore, for certainty as to the nature of the intervention envisaged in 
Article 218(1) TFEU is elusive, a fact that the economy of the ITLOS judgment may 
not disguise. Put differently, and from a broader perspective, it is only so far that the 
principle of institutional balance can take us in our effort to determine the allocation of 
tasks between the institutions under primary law. After all, the context-specific nature 
within which specific disputes are raised, coupled with the broad wording of primary 
law, are not conducive to certainty and predictability.   
 
8. Emerging threads  
 
8.1. A balanced approach to institutional balance 
 
The case-law examined in this article is not tilted towards a specific institution. Overall, 
the Court’s approach to the principle of institutional balance is rather balanced. Whilst 
the Commission has the power to represent the EU in international judicial proceedings 
and to withdraw a proposal, it may not sign even non-binding international agreements. 
The Council’s power to impose rigorous reporting duties on the Commission may not 
extend to impinging on the latter’s right to negotiate international treaties. Put 
differently, both the powers of the Commission to negotiate international agreements 
and of the Council to sign them is affirmed. As for the Parliament, the absence of a 
formal role in CFSP treaty-making may not lead to depriving the institution from its 
right to be informed promptly and at all stages of the treaty-making procedure. In fact, 
it is the Parliament that emerges as the clear winner in the institutional stakes, a 
conclusion that is hardly surprising given the significant enhancement of its position 
under the Lisbon Treaty. The case-law, furthermore, conveys a broader message: the 
procedures laid down in primary law have teeth, their scope is construed broadly, and, 
                                                 
95 This point was made by AG Sharpston (EU:C:2015:490, para. 84).  
96 Ibid, para. 91. 
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as the Hybrid Decisions judgment suggests, they may not be marginalized by the legal 
ingenuity of the Union’s institutions and the Member States.  
 
The volume, however, and intensity of inter-institutional disputes examined in this 
article are striking. For all its ambition to rationalize the Union’s institutional structure 
and streamline decision-making, the Lisbon Treaty has not provided greater clarity as 
to the allocation of tasks to different institutions, neither has it reduced the institutions’ 
appetite for legal disputes about turf wars.114 This development may be understood in 
the light of the broader scope of Article 218 TFEU which, therefore, provides more 
scope for inter-institutional argument. It may also be due to the ambiguity of the 
relevant primary rules and the central role of open-ended principles that govern the 
Union’s external action. Finally, the Union’s inherently idiosyncratic constitutional set 
up is also relevant: the position, for instance, of CFSP in the EU’s legal order provides 
ample scope for inter-institutional disputes, 115 especially given the merging of the 
objectives of the Union’s external action in Article 21 TEU.116  
 
If anything, the institutions’ determination to test the limits of their powers appears 
unabated.117 In fact, the case-law in this area suggests that there is little evidence of a 
principled stance in institutional interactions. The Commission’s antagonism with the 
Council regarding the content of negotiating directives is a case in point. The 
Commission’s eagerness to evade the constraints that would follow from its duty to 
inform the Council was in stark contrast to its position on interacting with the European 
Parliament. The interinstitutional agreement it drew up with the latter illustrated a 
generous approach to information-sharing: it covered, for instance,  the definition of 
the negotiating directives and the commitment to take due account of the Parliament’s 
comments and to facilitate the participation of Members of the European Parliament as 
observers in all relevant meetings. 118  Similarly, the Council’s objection to these 
interactions between the Commission and the Parliament (it viewed them as modifying 
the institutional balance under the Treaties and conferring powers that do not exist in 
primary law)119 are at odds with the close links which it sought to establish with the 
Commission in the process of negotiating international agreements.  
 
Then again, any principled position that institutions have may well be trumped by their 
desire to buttress and expand their powers. Let us take the Commission as an example. 
Kuijper argues that it ‘simply turns out to be the guardian of the τreaties, old and new’, 
whereas the Member States resist the application of the procedural changes introduced 
                                                 
114 For a similar assessment of the application of the Lisbon reforms in relation to internal decision-
making, see M Chamon, ‘Institutional Balance and Community Method in the Implementation of EU 
Legislation Following the Lisbon Treaty’, (2016) 53 CMLRev 1501 who is critical of both the 
institutions and the Court for having failed to realise Lisbon’s potential.   
115 See, for instance, P Koutrakos, The EU Common Security and Defence Policy (OUP 2013) Ch. 8, and 
H Merket, The EU and the Security-Development Nexus (Brill, 2016). 
116 See J Larik, Foreign Policy Objectives in European Constitutional Law (OUP, 2016). 
117 See P Van Elsuwege, ‘The Potential for Inter-Institutional Conflicts before the Court of Justice: 
Impact of the Lisbon Treaty’ in Cremona and Thies (eds), n10 above, 115. 
118 Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission 
[2010] OJ L 304/50, paras 23, 25 and Annex III. On the implications of the Agreement for the secrecy 
that international negotiations entail, see D Curtin, ‘Official Secrets and the Negotiation of International 
Agreements: Is the EU Executive Unbound?’, (2013) 50 CMRev 423. 
119 Council of the EU, Doc. 15018/10, 18 October 2010.  
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at Lisbon. 120 Viewed, however, against the background of the case-law examined in 
this article, the Commission does not appear any less eager than other institutions to 
expand its powers: the claim, for example, that its information-sharing obligation to the 
Council should be kept to a minimum did not follow from the Treaties; and it is difficult 
to see how the argument about signing non-binding international agreements was not 
an aggressive effort to expand its powers beyond those bestowed by primary law.  
 
The desire to expand their powers is inherent in any institution, and the complex 
institutional structure that EU primary law has established in order to reflect the 
Union’s sui generis constitutional order does not do much to curtail it. It is this 
complexity that the principle of institutional balance has sought to capture. Whilst it 
argued that the principle has retained its elusive quality, this article also revealed an  
overarching constraint on the willingness of the institutions to test the limits of their 
powers. This constraint has to do with the procedural rules laid down in the Treaty. 
They matter: they are enforced rigorously and may not be ignored for reasons of 
political or practical expediency. Viewed from this angle, strict compliance with 
Treaties-based procedures imposes an inherent constraint on how far the elusive 
character of institutional balance may feed inter-institutional antagonism. Quite how 
effective this constraint is depends on the rigour with which the Court is prepared to 
use it and the willingness of the institutions to spend less time and energy on turf wars 
and show more openness to working out what the duty of cooperation requires that they 
should do in practice. These factors will be explored below.   
 
8.2. The elusive quality of the duty of cooperation 
 
The judgments examined in this article shed light on a dimension of the duty of 
cooperation that had been underdeveloped. It is recalled that the duty has attracted 
considerable attention in the context of the relationship between the EU and the 
Member States, in particular regarding the obligations imposed on the latter under 
mixed agreements. This case law121 is, therefore, somewhat one-dimensional in its 
emphasis.122 The new formulation of Article 13(2) TEU at Lisbon has brought the inter-
institutional dimension of the principle to the fore and has enabled the Court to rule on 
the specific duties that it imposes on the Union’s institutions.  
 
The cases discussed in this article highlight the starkly different views of the institutions 
about what the duty of cooperation entails in practice. In the EU-Australia Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Agreement (Case C-425/13 Commission v Council), for instance, the 
positions of the Council and the Commission could not have been farther apart: what 
the former viewed as an information-sharing arrangement was deemed by the latter as 
an unacceptable encroachment on its power to negotiate. The wording of Article 13(2) 
TFEU and the inherently indeterminate scope of the principle of cooperation may not 
                                                 
120 PJ Kuijper, ‘From the Board: Litigation on External Relations Powers after Lisbon: The Member 
States Reject Their Own Treaty’, (2016) 43 LIEI 1 at 12.  
121  Case C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland EU:C:2006:34, Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden 
EU:C:2010:203, and Case C-45/07 Commission v Greece EU:C:2009:81 
122 In Case C-600/14 Germany v Council EU:C:2017:935, the duty cooperation between the EU institutions and the Member States was explored in the context of Article 218(9) TFEU. The Grand Chamber examined the progress of the decision-making process that led to the adoption of a decision about the Union’s position regarding the revision of the Convention concering International Carriage by Rail (COTIF), and held that the Council had not acted in violation of the duty of cooperation (para. 107 of the judgment). 
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constrain such extravagantly opposing views. Similar issues are raised in cases where 
the principle of cooperation is expressed in more specific terms, for instance in relation 
to the powers of the European Parliament under Article 218(10) TFEU. While the 
wording of the latter provision is more specific, the disputes in the EU-Tanzania 
Transfer Agreement (Case C-263/14 Parliament v Council) and EU-Mauritius Transfer 
Agreement (Case C-658/11 Parliament v Council) cases reveal considerable differences 
in how the institutions construe their obligation to interact. In all these cases, the 
question remains: for the EU institutions, at what point does their duty to cooperate end 
and where does it begin to amount to an infringement of other institutions’ 
prerogatives?  
 
In addressing this question, three threads emerge from the case-law examined in this 
article. The first is that the duty of cooperation may not sanction a deviation from the 
procedures laid down in primary law. In other words, the limit to what the duty entails 
is to be found in the specific provisions that articulate the role of the EU institutions in 
the Union’s external representation in general and in treaty-making procedures in 
particular. This position may appear to restrain the appetite of certain institutions to 
engage in an overly creative construction of their powers. The relevant primary rules, 
however, are often not specific enough to tackle the elusive quality of the duty of 
cooperation. They are tested, instead, by the legal ingenuity of the warring institutions 
and require interpretation themselves by the Court which is, therefore, called upon to 
rule in a series of increasingly context-specific disputes.  
 
Second, the Court construes the duty of cooperation by reference to the specific factual 
and legal context within which it is called upon to adjudicate. Whilst it tells us what the 
duty may not entail in a specific case, the Court is distinctly reluctant to offer a glimpse 
of what the duty may, in fact, be about. This approach is tied in with the theme of 
economy that underpins the case-law as a whole (and which will be examined further 
below in Section 8.3). There is, however, one aspect that emerges clearly from these 
judgments, namely the rigorous construction of information-sharing and reporting at 
the core of the duty of cooperation. This approach appears in different contexts. It is 
particularly important for the European Parliament, not only because it is laid down in 
Article 218(10) TFEU, but also because it applies to areas where it has no other input 
(such as the CFSP). This is all the more so, given the institution’s central role in the 
conclusion of most international agreements by the Union. Information-sharing, 
however, has been developed by the Court as an essential counterweight to the 
negotiating power of the Commission and in order to protect the position of the Council. 
It is interesting that the latter institution, which was most resistant to sharing 
information with the Parliament, should now become the beneficiary of a rigorous 
obligation that the Court imposed on the Commission in the process of treaty 
negotiations. Whilst broad, the duty to inform is by no means unlimited, as it may not 
impinge on the decision-making power of an institution. This limit brings us back to 
the general constraint on the duty of cooperation, that is primary law setting out the 
powers of the institutions and the procedures governing treaty-making.   
 
The third thread of this case-law follows from the above and is about the elusive quality 
of the duty of cooperation. In the words of Advocate General Jääskinen, even though 
the principle ‘makes it possible to resolve the uncertainties arising from “grey areas” of 
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the Treaties, … its content cannot be precisely defined’.124 This is by no means peculiar 
to the relations between the institutions. The scope of the duty of cooperation that binds 
the Member States in the context of mixed agreements is similarly elusive: whilst 
shedding some light in the specific context within which it has arisen,  the relevant case-
law has merely alerted the legal advisors in the foreign affairs ministries of the Member 
States to the far-reaching implications of the duty of cooperation. It has not brought 
clarity, let alone certainty, as to what it may entail generally in external relations.  
 
The elusive quality of the duty of cooperation has two implications. The first is about 
the policy-making institutions: their good will is essential for the principle of 
cooperation to become a workable tool for their interactions, rather than an opportunity 
for constant skirmishes. This may be viewed as a leap of faith on their part. The legal 
framework, however, set out in primary law is sufficiently flexible to grant institutions 
leeway and accommodate concerns the latter may have about the essence of their 
powers, provided that they reign on their maximalist urges. This is part of what, in 
another context, Dashwood has called ‘the wonderful adaptability of the … Union … 
[that] is surely the mark of a constitutional order well equipped for Darwinian 
survival’.125 In interpreting institutional balance and the duty of cooperation, the case-
law examined in this article illustrates a balanced and pragmatic approach. The 
institutions could do a lot worse than show pragmatism themselves and avoid wasting 
energy and time that they can ill afford in turf-wars.  
 
The second implication is about the role of the Court of Justice: already considerable 
in the development of EU external relations law, it becomes central when it comes to 
the interpretation of principles that underpin every aspect of what the EU institutions 
do in the world. This is explored in the following section.  
 
8.3. A pragmatic Court and the rigorous enforcement of procedural rules 
 
The analysis of the case-law in this article tells an interesting story not only about the 
style of reasoning on the basis of which the principle of institutional balance and the 
duty of cooperation are interpreted, but also about the role of the Court of Justice in the 
area. There is emphasis on literal interperation and a degree of economy in the 
judgments, as if they sought to address only the specific issues raised by the parties and 
say no more than necessary to answer the specific questions. There is a distinct 
emphasis on the specific legal and factual context within which each case reached the 
Court. The judgments largely avoid abstract pronouncements and suggest a distinct 
reluctance to elaborate on the practical implications of broad principles (such as the 
duty of cooperation), unless by reference to specific examples raised in the case before 
the Court. They are also devoid of an analysis of competence issues. There is a striking 
difference, for instance, between the approach underpinning the case-law examined in 
this article and the Mox Plant case, in which the Court handed down 12 years ago a 
pivotal judgment on the duty of cooperation, albeit in the different context of national 
obligations towards the EU.126 This judgment was an example of a sensible conclusion 
                                                 
124  Case C-409/13 Council v Commission (Macro-Financial Assistance to Third Countries) 
EU:C:2014:2470, para. 98. 
125 A Dashwood: ‘The Institutional Framework and the Institutional Balance’ in M Dougan and S Currie 
(eds), 50 Years of the European Treaties – Looking Back and Thinking Forward (Hart Publishing, 2009) 
1 at 17.  
126 Case C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland EU:C:2006:34. 
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let down by a convoluted line of reasoning: it engaged in an esoteric examination of 
what the conclusion of UNCLOS had actually signified for the Union’s competence, 
an approach that was neither warranted by the facts of the case, nor necessary in order 
to apply the duty of cooperation. The case-law examined in this article, on the other 
hand, avoided this path and reached its conclusion by following the most direct route 
possible.  
 
This approach has been criticized as ‘minimalist’ and unhelpful in terms of contributing 
to ‘future process efficiency’.127 Given the elusive character of the duty of cooperation, 
outlined above, should the Court be more assertive and spell out more clearly what the 
duty of cooperation is about? Minimalism is not necessarily a bad thing. It is recalled 
that the notion of judicial minimalism, as articulated by Sunstein, is  identified with the 
avoidance of abstractions and the ‘focus on the particular question at hand, not on other 
questions, even though it would be possible to resolve them too’.128 
There are good reasons for such an approach in the context discussed here. Questions 
about the duty of cooperation are raised in Luxembourg in a specific legal and factual 
context and with reference to a specific course of action by the institutions involved. 
To construe the duty of cooperation rigorously (as the Court did, for instance, in the 
PFOS case by imposing, in effect, a duty of abstention on a Member State in the contet 
of mixed agremenets)129 is one thing; to suggest an alternative to what the institutions 
and the Member States did (which is what it was criticised for in the Hybrid Decisions 
case,130 examined above in Section 5) is quite another. The argument for a more active 
approach in this area assumes a role for the Court that the latter has not claimed for 
itself and which it may be ill-suited to carry out. It is not for the Luxembourg judges to 
provide elaborate analyses aiming to address all the questions that practitioners and 
academics may have about specific areas of law. To do so would amount to construing 
legal principles in the abstract and would risk becoming akin to law-making. It would 
also be bound to fail, as it would seek to capture an endless range of legal possibilities 
without anchoring them to a specific set of facts. That is not to say that the reasoning 
in judgments should be deficient. Closer attention, however, should be paid to the legal 
and factual context within which specific disputes are raised and within which 
judgments are rendered.  
 
The sense of balance that was pointed out above in relation to the Court’s approach to 
the institutional balance also characterizes the Court’s own role as it emerges from this 
case-law. On the one hand, the procedural powers of the Union’s institutions are 
construed without unsettling the overall institutional scheme that is designed to reflect 
the Union’s constitutional order. On the other hand, the procedural rules governing 
treaty-making are interpreted in a dynamic manner: they have teeth and the Court is 
                                                 
127 V Demedts and M Chamon, ‘The Commission back on the leash: No autonomy to sign non-binding 
agreements on behalf of the EU: Council v. Commission’, (2017) 54 CMLRev 245 at 254. 128 C R Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 44. See also id, One Case at a Time – Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), and the criticism in his ‘Beyond Judicial Minimalism’, (2008) 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 825.  129 Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden EU:C:2010:203 where Sweden made a unilateral proposal that 
certain substances become subject to the regulatory regime laid down in the Stockholm Convention in 
Persistent Organic Pollutants (a mixer agreement). It had failed to convince the EU to put forward this 
proposal. See the analysis in Koutrakos, n65 above, at 191-6 and A Delgado Casteleiro and J Larik, ‘The 
Duty to Remain Silent: Limitless Loyalty in EU External Relations’, (2011) 36 ELRev 524.  130 EU:C:2015:282.  
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prepared to construe and enforce them rigorously. Viewed from a broader perspective, 
this approach complements the recent emphasis on the procedural rules that governs 
EU external relations case-law: by taking procedural rules seriously, the case-law 
illustrates another arena for the institutions and the Member States to fight their battles, 
away from the competence-centred tensions that shaped the development of this area 
of law.    
 
The emphasis on the rigour of procedural rules provides an interesting contrast to the 
pragmatic stance that the Court has adopted recently in high profile substantive policy 
areas that have exercised both the EU and national policy-makers. In other words, the 
more pragmatic the Court has become in dealing with the substance of heavily 
politicized and sensitive legal disputes, the more confident it is in enforcing the 
procedural rules that govern the interactions between the Union’s institutions. Before 
developing this argument further, however, a clarification is necessary: this analysis 
does not suggest that a general trend of judicial restraint is emerging from the case-law, 
neither does it claim that the EU’s Judges defer to the EU’s decision-makers without 
exception. Bold judgments are handed down in areas of considerable interest, such as 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy where the Court has interpreted its 
jurisdiction in brod terms.131 Consider, too, the rigorous interpretation of the principle 
of autonomy in the recent Case C-284/16 Achmea.132 The argument here is, instead, 
about a recent trend in relation to substantive policy issues in heavily politicised policy 
fields 
 
There are three such areas where a distinctly realist streak has emerged in the Court’s 
approach to the main policy challenges that have divided the Union’s electorate. These 
include access of EU citizens to benefits, the management of the euro-crisis, and the 
movement of refugees. In relation to citizenship, there is a shift of emphasis in the last 
few years towards a stricter construction of the  rights to which non-economically active 
citizens are entitled pursuant to EU secondary legislation.133 As for the euro-crisis, the 
Court has been loathe to challenge the legal ingenuity of the EU institutions and the 
Member States  pursuant to which they have sought to stave off sovereign default in 
the Eurozone.134 Finally, the Court has been so keen to preserve the principle of mutual 
trust that underpins the EU rules on asylum procedures that it has risked a lingering 
                                                 131  See Case C-455/14P H v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2016:569 and Case C-72/15 Rosneft ECLI:EU:C:2016:381. It is noteworthy, however, that even in these cases, when it came to the substance of the case, the Court acknowledged the wide discretion of the legislature, and exercised its jurisdiction cautiously (see the analysis in P Koutrakos, ‘Judicial Review in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy’, (2018) 67 ICLQ 1).   132 Case C-284/16 Slovak Republic v Achmea BV EU:C:2018:158. 
133 See Case 333/13 Dano EU:C:2014:2358, Case C-67/14 Alimanovic [2014] EU:C:2015:597, Case C-
308/14 Commission v United Kingdom [2016] EU:C:2016:436. From the voluminous literature on the 
topic, see G. Davies, ‘Migrant Union Citizens and social assistance: trying to be reasonable about self-
sufficiency’, College of Europe Research Papers in Law 2 (2016), N. Nic Shuibhne, ‘”What I tell you 
three times is true”- Lawful Residence and Equal Treatment after Dano’ [2016] 23 MJ 908, D. Thym, 
‘The Elusive Limits of Solidarity: Residence Rights of and Social Benefits for Economically Inactive 
Union Citizens’ [2015] 52 CMLRev 17. 
134 See Case C-370/12 Pringle EU:C:2012:756, Case C-370/12 Gauweiler ECLI:EU:C:2015:400. See, 
amongst others, P Craig, ‘Gauweiler and the legality of outright monetary transactions’, (2016) 41 
ELRev 4.   
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confrontation with the European Court of Human Rights.135 The realist approach of the 
Court to the issue of the management of the refugee crisis has been illustrated recently 
in Case C-638/16 PPU X and X:136 contrary to the much-publicized advice by Advocate 
General Mengozzi, the Court held that EU law did not require a Member State to grant, 
outside its territory, a humanitarian visa to third-country nationals so that the latter 
would be able to travel to the Member State concerned in order to apply for asylum.  
 
In the three areas mentioned above, the Union’s judiciary has either adjusted its 
interpretation of EU secondary legislation in order to reflect more accurately its  
wording and context (citizens rights), or has shied away from unpacking complex legal 
arrangements introduced by the EU institutions and the Member States in order to 
tackle policy areas of extraordinary political sensitivity (euro-crisis, refugees). While 
understandable from a practical point of view, this pragmatic stance raises challenges 
for the Court itself. A case in point is a set of three Orders by the General Court in 
which an action for annulment of the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 on 
refugees was dismissed as inadmissible.137 The General Court reached this conclusion 
because, whilst it referred expressly to the European Union and the Members of the 
European Council, the Statement was, in fact, a document adopted by the Heads of 
State or Government of Governments of the Member States. As it was not adopted by 
the European Council, its adoption could not be challenged under Article 263 TFEU. 
Tackling the refugee crisis has challenged not only the Union’s policy-makers,138 but 
also its judiciary. It is hardly surprising that the General Court would be reluctant to 
unpack the sensitive and controversial arrangements reached at the highest level in an 
area of profound political significance. The reasoning, however, of the Orders in 
question is striking, not least for the absence of any analysis of the content of the 
Statement and the ensuing question whether the latter ought to have been adopted by 
the EU institutions in accordance with Article 218 TFEU. This is not about whether the 
Statement amounts to a legally binding agreement – the General Court did not even get 
to that point, as it was satisfied that the references to the EU and its institutions in the 
Statement itself were erroneous.  
 
It is not only in relation to the main policy areas outlined above that the theme of the 
Court as a realist actor emerges. In relation to the Lisbon reform of the implementation 
of EU secondary legislation, the Court’s approach has been viewed as timid. It is 
recalled that, in introducing the new provisions of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, the 
Lisbon Treaty distinguishes between delegation and implementation and provides for 
the involvement of either the legislature or the Member States.139 Considering it a 
drastic and promising innovation, the proponents of this system have been distinctly 
underwhelmed by its interpretation by the Court of Justice. 140  For instance, the 
institutions have been granted wide discretion to resort to delegated or implementing 
                                                 
135 See Case C-411/10 NS EU:C:2011:865, Case C-4/11 Puid EU:C:2013:740, Case C-394/12, Abdullahi 
EU:C:2013:813. For a brief comment, see P Koutrakos, ‘ECJ, Strasbourg and national courts: an exercise 
in guesswork?’, (2015) 45 ELRev 641. 
136 Case C-638/16 PPU X and X EU:C:2017:173. 
137 See T-192/16 NF EU:T:2017:128, T-193/16 NG EU:T:2017:129, and T-257/16 NM EU:T:2017:130. 
138 D Thym, “The “refugee crisis” as a challenge of legal design and institutional legitimacy’, (2016) 53 
CMLRev 1545. 
139 See the analysis in C F Bergström and D Ritleng (eds), Rulemaking by the European Commission 
(OUP, 2016). 
140 See, for instance, Chamon, n114 above, and C Tovo, ‘Delegation of Legislative Powers in the EU: 
How EU Institutions Have Eluded the Lisbon Reform’, (2017) 47 ELRev 677. 
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legislation 141  or even to endow agencies, rather than the Commission, with 
considerable powers.142 In the light of this approach, the Court has been criticised for 
undermining the effectiveness of the Lisbon reform and for having ‘missed 
opportunities to structure the political process’.143  
 
Whilst it is not for this article to address this criticism, it is worth-pointing out that such 
arguments are underpinned by a clear conception of what the Court ought to be doing 
in the Union’s constitutional order: it should be interventionist and read into the opaque 
Treaty provisions on rule-making a more powerful role for the Commission, hence 
promoting the ‘Community’ approach to policy-making. This view, however, is driven 
by a specific conception of how the EU legal order should evolve and does not take 
sufficient account of the policy context within which procedural choices are made.144 
After all, even in areas less politically sensitive than, say, the management of the euro-
crisis, the Union’s legislature has been given wide discretion.145 Be that as it may, the 
judiciary’s approach to Articles 290 and 291 TFEU is faithful to the wording of the 
Treaty and does not override the policy choices of its drafters. Viewed from this angle, 
this area of law has something in common with the Court’s approach to the procedural 
rules governing treaty-making. In both cases, there is reluctance to upset the carefully 
calibrated institutional balance as reflected in primary rules.  
 
9. Conclusion  
 
The case-law examined in this article suggests that the law on EU external relations is 
reaching a level of maturity. Rather than being confined to its exhausting competence-
centred adolescence, it expands gradually by engaging more with the procedural 
arrangements that govern how the EU may act in the world and exploring the limits of 
what can be done with the legal armoury provided for in primary law. Our 
understanding of this area of law benefits from this development, as a number of 
important procedural questions with constitutional implications are being addressed. 
This age of maturity is all the more welcome in the post-Lisbon institutional landscape 
where the application of the procedural rules on treaty-making is not burdened by 
institutional harmony, and the appetite of the institutions for turf wars has by no means 
waned. 
 
In its analysis of the relevant case-law, this article put forward the following arguments. 
First, the principle of institutional balanced has been applied in a balanced way and 
with acute awareness of the specific factual and legal context within which disputes are 
raised. The powers granted under the Treaties have been construed with due regard to 
the overall constitutional character of the Union’s structure and without tilting the 
carefully calibrated equilibrium in favour of a specific institution. Whilst the role of the 
                                                 
141 See Case C-427/12 Commission v Parliament and Council (Biocides) EU:C:2014:170 and Case C-
88/14 Commission v Parliament and Council (Visa Reciprocity) EU:C:2015:499. 
142 See Case C-270/12 UK v Council and Commission (ESMA) EU:C:2014:18. 
143 Chamon, n114 above, at 1543. 
144 For instance, Everson argues that, to have ruled otherwise in ESMA (n140 above), the Court would 
have shown ‘foolish judicial disregard for the vital need to ensure continuing financial stability within 
Europe’: ‘European agencies: Barely legal’ in M Everson, Monda and E Vos (eds), European Agencies 
in between Institutions and Member States (Kluwer Law International, 2014) 50.   
145 For the need for discretion in ensuring the financial stability of the Eurozone, see K Lenaerts, ‘EMU 
and the EU’s constitutional framework’, (2014) 39 ELRev 753.  
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Parliament has been enhanced significantly, this reflects faithfully its increased powers 
under the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
Second, the duty of cooperation has been construed with a strong procedural dimension 
that aims to strengthen the interactions between the institutions in treaty-making. And 
yet, for all its prominence under the current constitutional arrangements, its content 
remains somewhat elusive. This is a characteristic that the duty of cooperation between 
the institutions shares with its sibling, that is the principle of sincere cooperation which 
binds Member States in their actions on the external plane, and which is unlikely to 
dissipate.  
 
Third, in its interpretation of the principle of institutional balance and the duty of 
cooperation, the Court of Justice has adopted a careful and balanced approach,  often 
on the basis of a literal interpretation of primary law, therefore complementing the 
pragmatic streak that characterises the Court’s recent case-law in areas of acute 
politically sensitivity. In relation to the duty of cooperation in particular, the Court has 
refrained from either articulating its scope in the abstract or from providing alternatives 
as to how institutions could comply with it.  
 
Finally, it is not the above approach that is responsible for the continuing tensions in 
inter-institutional relations. In fact, it is sensible that the Court of Justice should be keen 
to steer clear of making suggestions about policy choices. Neither are these tensions 
due to the articulation of the principle of institutional balance and the duty of 
cooperation in primary law. After all, there is an inherent limit to what constitutional 
law may achieve in this area. It is the practice of the Union’s institutions that is 
paramount, and it is the Council, the Commission and the Parliament that should reflect 
on how they relate to each other. In effect, the case-law examined in this article places 
a heavier burden on the Union’s institutions. Rather than viewing it as yet another 
opportunity for power grabbing, they should take a leap of faith: they should take the 
principle of institutional balance seriously, and approach the duty of sincere 
cooperation in the EU’s treaty-making conduct in a constructive spirit. The less time 
and energy they waste on turf wars about their procedural powers, the greater their 
contribution to inceasing the efficiency of the Union’s treaty-making practice.146 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
146 This argument was made in the context of competence-based disputes in P Koutrakos, ‘‘Legal Basis and Delimitation of Competence in EU External Relations’ in Cremona and  De Witte (eds), n12 above, 171. 
 
